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International Law and the Interception of
Civil Aircraft: Flight 007
James R. Fox*
The downing of Korean Airlines Flight 007 by a Soviet inter-
ceptor on September 1, 1983,1 caused the international civil aviation
community to face a recurring problem: military interception of off-
course civilian aircraft.2 Such incidents raise a legal problem because
of the tension between one of the most basic principles of interna-
tional law, sovereignty over territorial airspace," and the limitation
placed on the exercise of that sovereignty by customary international
law and the Chicago Convention.' In practical terms, an intruding
aircraft can be very threatening; at the same time a commercial air-
liner is very vulnerable. Four previous incidents bear directly on the
recent tragedy." The problem of aerial intrusions is not uncommon,
and, in all but a few instances in the last three decades, intrusions
have been countered through diplomatic channels." Indeed a review
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law. B.A. 1972, Otterbein College; J.D.
1974, Ohio State University College of Law; M.S. 1978, Drexel University; Diploma 1983,
McGill University Institute of Air and Space Law.
1. The United States issued a detailed account of the Flight 007 incident shortly after
its occurrence. This account, including transcripts of U.S. interceptions of the Soviet fighters'
transmissions, was presented at the United Nations Security Council meeting. See Robinson,
U.S. Says Soviets Knew Korean Airlines 747 Was Commercial Flight, 119 Aviation Week
Space Tech. 18, Sept. 12, 1983 [hereinafter cited as Robinson].
2. On September 12, 1983, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution
deploring the destruction of the Korean airliner and welcoming the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization's (ICAO) activities investigating the matter. The Soviets vetoed the resolu-
tion. N.Y. Times, September 13, 1983 at Al, col.2 (includes text of the Resolution). ICAO
began its formal work on the matter with an extraordinary session of its Council called at the
request of the Republic of Korea. Ott, ICAO Studying Its Rules of Interceptions, 119 AVIA-
TION WEEK SPACE TECH. 24 (Sept. 12, 1983).
3. For the U.S. position see, M. WHITEMAN, 9 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 309
(1968). For the Soviet position see A. Kislov & S. Krylov, State Sovereignty in Airspace in
Legal Problems of Space Exploration, S. Doc. No.26, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1037 (1961). The
principle is codified as Article I of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7,
1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter cited as Chicago
Convention].
4. See Chicago Convention, Articles 5,9,23,37, and Annex 2.
5. Previous articles have reviewed the history of this problem. See generally Lissitzyn,
The Treatment of Aerial Intruders in Recent Practice and International Law, 47 AM. J.INT'L.
L. 559 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Lissitzyn]; Hughes, Aerial Intrusion by Civil Airliners and
the Use of Force, 45 J.AIR L.CoM. 595 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hughes].
6. In 1982, the New York Times reported 17 incidents (both civilian and military). For
of the many instances of stray civilian aircraft suggests that a vast
majority of the nations of the world disavow the use of force. The
following exceptional incidents, however, have provoked the interna-
tional civil aviation community to develop standards of conduct
within customary international law the Chicago Convention and the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
The first major incident involving the shooting down of a com-
mercial airliner occured when an Israeli Constellation with fifty-
eight people aboard was destroyed when it strayed into Bulgarian
airspace. 8 This incident led to what every international lawyer
dreams of-a case brought before the International Court of Justice.
The disappointing outcome of the case was the court's refusal to de-
cide the matter because of lack of jurisdiction over Bulgaria. How-
ever, the Memorials 9 submitted by the plaintiffs are indicative of va-
rious national policies. The British rejected the use of force against a
civilian plane catagorically. 10 Both the United States and Israel es-
poused the use of force only when there is a "security necessity.""1
The second incident was not fatal, but illustrates one of the po-
sitions taken by the Soviet Union on interception of civilian aircraft.
French fighters intercepted a Soviet plane carrying Soviet President
Leonid Breznev when the plane strayed into a prohibited zone de-
clared by the French in the Algerian Civil War. The plane ignored
various signals from the intercepting fighters until warning shots
were fired in front of the plane. Needless to say, the Soviets pro-
tested the incident, expressing outrage that any nation would fire on
a Soviet airliner. The Soviets called the French action "an act of
international banditry.""
The incident that provoked the greatest international outcry was
the shooting down of a Libyan Arab Airlines Boeing 727 by Israel
when it strayed over the Sinai on February 21, 1973. The death of
106 people combined with the general international animosity to-
ward Israel to provide the impetus for the development of a facially
more humane norm of conduct.
The only exception taken to this stated norm of conduct was the
position of the United States. Though supportive of the development
a detailed list of Communist Bloc violations of U.S. Airspace see 129 CONG. REc. 12535-37
(1983).
7. For several incidents involving both civilian and military intrusions in the period
shortly after World War II, see Lissitzyn, supra note 5; Hughes, supra note 5.
8. See Ministry of Communications of the State of Israel, Report of the Commission of
Inquiry on the Shooting Down of EL AL Aircraft 4X-AKC on July 27, 1955.
9. Aerial Incident of July 1955, Israel v. Bulgaria, United States v. Bulgaria, United
Kingdom v. Bulgaria, I.C.J. Pleadings [hereinafter cited as Aerial Incident].
10. Id. (Memorial of the U.K.).
11. Id. (Memorials of the U.S. and Israel).
12. N.Y. Times, February 10, 1961, at Al, col.8.
of more restrictive standards for the interception of intruding civil
aircraft, the United States attempted to soften the condemnation of
Israel in the United Nations, 18 President Nixon hosted the visit of
Prime Minister Golda Meir a week after the incident without com-
menting publicly on it. 14 This position contrasts sharply with the
United States' current stand.15
Following the Israeli/Libyan incident, the Soviets condemned
Israel:
The Soviet Delegation [was] convinced that ICAO could
not remain aloof from the barbaric act committed by Israel a
week ago. They could not agree with those who were trying to
prevent it from making its own assessment of what had actually
happened. ICAO was a specialized agency of the United Na-
tions, pledged to the promotion of air safety in all parts of the
world, and this was a terrible catastrophe, which was clearly the
result of premeditated action by the Israeli aggressors, at a time
when world public opinion was deeply concerned over the con-
tinuing acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation, when
ICAO, at many meetings, was trying to find means of prevent-
ing crimes against air safety and punishing those responsible,
and when States were taking serious measures to ensure the
safety of civil air transport and of those making use of it. The
Assembly, the highest aviation forum in the world, must
strongly condemn this criminal act, in accordance with the prin-
ciples embodied in the Chicago convention and other interna-
tional legal instruments. 6
In April 1978, in the most bizarre incident of aerial intrusion, a
Korean Airlines flight carrying 103 passengers and crew members
from Paris to Seoul via the polar route wandered off course and into
Soviet airspace. After lingering for some time, apparently unde-
tected, it was intercepted and fired upon by Soviet fighters. Two peo-
ple were killed and sixteen injured. The Korean plane also sustained
considerable damage, but two hours later made an emergency land-
ing on a frozen lake.17 Unlike either the Israeli/Libyan or the 1983
Soviet/Korean catastrophe, the 1978 incident provoked little discus-
sion in international law fora. Both Soviets and Koreans appeared
13. ICAO to Investigate Downing of Libyan Airliner over Sinai, 68 DEP'T STATE BULL.
369 (1973).
14. Visit of Prime Minister Golda Meir, 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 212 (March 5,
1973).
15. See, e.g., President Reagan's Address on the Soviet Attack on Korea Civilian Air-
liner, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1199 (Sept. 12, 1983).
16. Res. and Minutes, ICAO Assembly, 19th Sess., Doc. 9061 at 38 (Feb. 28, 1973)
(Statement of the Soviet delegation during the debate on ICAO Resolution A19-1).
17. South Korean Plane Plunged 30.000 Feet After Being Fired On, N.Y. Times, April
24, 1978, at Al, col.8 [hereinafter cited as South Korean Plane].
very embarrassed, and the Soviets released the passengers and crew
with only minor wrangling.18 Korea did not protest the shooting
down of the plane, but instead thanked the Soviets for the release of
the passengers and crew.' 9 The United States' greatest concern
about this incident involved its own security. The early revelation by
the Carter Administration of the incident may have disclosed the
United States' capacity to monitor Soviet airspace.2 0 Curiously, an
attack which killed or wounded eighteen people and in which only
the tremendous effort of the Korean pilot effected a safe landing and
saved the others provoked no protest of the Soviet use of force from
any corner.2 ' Eyewitness accounts from passengers indicate that the
Soviet fighters followed the airliner for about fifteen minutes, then
fell back and fired without warning. The Soviets wrested a "guilty
plea" from the Korean pilot and navigator before releasing them.2
The Soviet downing of Korean Airlines Flight 007, a Boeing
747 with 269 people aboard, has been the most widely publicized
and debated of all cases of aerial intrusion. United States and Japa-
nese intelligence agencies have made a great deal of factual informa-
tion available.2 4 The Soviets have made more public statements than
on previous occasions.2 5 Still, the crucial question-why did flight
007 go so far off course-has not been and probably will not be an-
swered. Neither faulty navigation equipment nor a spy mission
seems to be a very plausible answer, and neither an admission from
the intelligence communities nor recovery of the wreckage is likely.
2 1
Among other factors that would illuminate the incident and
help in the development of procedures for avoiding such calamities is
the extent to which the Soviet interceptors followed the current pro-
cedures recommended in the Chicago Convention. The Soviet pilots
18. Airliner's Survivors Reach Finland, Tell of Soviet Jet Attack, N.Y. Times, April
23, 1978, at Al, col.4.
19. Park Thanks Soviets, N.Y. Times, April 25, 1978, at A10, col.1.
20. Korean Pilot, Navigator Held by Soviets, 108 AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECH.
34 (May 1, 1978).
21. There is no mention of the incident in the Department of State Bulletin or Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents nor was a protest lodged at the U.N. Security Council
or the ICAO Council.
22. South Korean Plane, supra note 17.
23. Soviets Free Last Two in Korean Plane Case, N.Y. Times, April 30, 1978, at Al,
col.5.
24. Robinson, supra note 1.
25. Text of Statement by Soviet Government, N.Y. Times, September 7, 1983, at A16,
col.l; Soviet Cautions West Its Fighters Will Shoot Again, 119 AVIATION WEEK SPACE
TECH. 22 (Sept. 19, 1983) (Report of Marshall Ogarkov's news conference) [hereinafter cited
as Soviet Cautions West].
26. Soviet Action Impedes Search for Korean Plane, N.Y. Times, October 18, 1983, at
A5, col.7. (Since the writing of this article, the ICAO investigation has adpoted the view that
human error in programming the navigational equipment was the probable cause.)
27. Chicago Convention, supra note 3, Annex 2, Attachment A, Interception of Civil
Aircraft (adopted April 1, 1981).
claim to have made repeated efforts to contact the stray plane by
radio using the standard international emergency frequency 28 and by
using standard visual signals. The intercepted radio transmissions re-
leased by the United States do not substantiate these claims. The
United States, however, did retract its earlier allegation that the so-
viets did not fire warning shots as claimed. 9 Of all the Soviet claims
about the incident, one of the least credible is that the interceptor
pilots did not recognize Flight 007 as a commercial airliner. If true,
this evidences a dangerous and appalling lack of training. A Boeing
747 is big and slow and, with its hump-backed cockpit, has the most
distinctive silhouette of any common aircraft.
Whichever version of the facts one believes, clearly shooting
down commercial aircraft should be forbidden by international law.
Less drastic steps can and should be taken to preserve national se-
curity interests. Indeed, in none of the fatal incidents involving civil-
ian airliners has any security necessity been shown. Flight 007, in
particular, was destroyed as it was leaving Soviet airspace. It was
posing no threat of attack at the time. Any intelligence that could
possibly be gathered by one overflight hardly warrants deadly retali-
ation.80 The excessiveness of the retaliatory measure in light of the
threat posed is especially evident when the retaliation is aimed at an
aircraft of uncertain identity which may be in distress with malfunc-
tioning radio and navigational equipment.
The preeminent source of international law is custom.81 "The
use of force against intruding civilian airliners is narrowly limited by
customary international law."32 Custom recognizes only a very lim-
ited "security necessity" exception. Several nations, including the
United States and Israel,88 sought this exception, but it has not been
accepted by a vast majority of the nations of the world either in
practice or opinio juris.8 4 Indeed, despite reports of repeated intru-
sions over sensitive areas by Aeroflot airliners, the United States has
never acted upon ita ' and appears to have repudiated it.36 Arguably,
28. The United States disputes this claim and argues that Soviet fighters are not
equipped with radios capable of using these frequencies. 119 AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE
TECH. 26 (Sept. 12, 1983).
29. U.S. Admits Soviets Fired Cannon Shots, 119 AVIATION WEEK SPACE TECH. 25
(Sept. 19, 1983).
30. A generally accepted principle of international law is that the use of force should be
proportional to the gravity of the threat or offence. The Naulilaa Incident (Get. v. Port.), 2
R.Int'l. Arb. Awards 1012 (1928).
31. For a more detailed development, see Lissitzyn, supra note 5; Hughes, supra note 5.
32. Hughes, supra note 5 at 620.
33. Aerial Incident, supra note 9.
34. See Res. and Minutes, ICAO Assembly, 19th Sess., Doc. 9061, at 17-64 (1973).
35. Statement of F.A.A. Administrator J. Lynn Helms before the Extraordinary Session
of the Council of the Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Sept. 15, 1983 at 13. The International Court
of Justice has required both practice and opiniojuris to establish a customary rule. North Sea
Continental Shelf Case, 1969 I.C.J. 3.
the "security necessity rule" therefore is not part of customary inter-
national law, and the incidents and claims upon which it is based are
all violations of the customary rule that force should never be used
against a civilian airliner. The Soviet Union implied such a rule in
its protest of the 1961 incident.87 Currently, however, the Soviets
claim the right to shoot at anything in their sovereign airspace, a
claim that appears to be unique among nations."8
In addition to this rule of customary international law, most na-
tions have ratified the Chicago Convention, agreeing to " . . . cer-
tain principles and arrangements in order that civil aviation may de-
velop in a safe and orderly manner . . . ."" Among these
arrangements are provisions for the peaceful settlements of dis-
putes.4 ° Nowhere does the Convention countenance violence against
civil aviation, even in the provisions regarding prohibited zones. The
proper course of action for the Soviets or for any nation detecting an
intruding aircraft is first to take steps to identify it4 ' and then to aid
it if it appears to be in distress. 42 If the aircraft is offending the
sovereignty of the nation or violating a prohibited zone, the pilot
should be warned of any danger and protests should be made
through diplomatic channels. The latter of course would include re-
sort to the provisions of the Chicago Convention and the submission
of a complaint to the ICAO Council. If the Soviets had pressed their
charge of espionage-misuse of civil aviation 43-ICAO could, and
undoubtedly would, have investigated the incident impartially. Re-
gardless of the outcome of that investigation, the Soviets would have
fared much better in world public opinion with little injury to their
security by using diplomacy instead of missiles.
Four times since 1955 commercial airliners have been shot
down with a total loss of over four hundred lives. In none of these
cases could any real threat to security be shown. Each incident pre-
cipitated calls for preventive measures, and some have been insti-
tuted. Most significantly, ICAO has adopted special recommenda-
36. Mrs. Kirkpatrick, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, asked:
Does a nation which is not at war have the right to shoot down planes that enter
its airspace without authorization? ...no. We do not believe that the protec-
tion of the sovereignty of any nation gives that nation a right to shoot down any
plane in peacetime, flying any place over its territory.
U.N.S.C.O.R. (2476th mtg.) at 67, U.N.Doc. S/PV.2476 (1983).
37. N.Y. Times, supra note 12. See also Soviet Statement in the ICAO Assembly De-
bate, Res. and Minutes, ICAO Assembly, 19th Sess., Doc. 9061 at 38 (1973).
38. See, e.g., Bulgaria to Pay U.S. for Airlines Deaths. N.Y. Times, Aug 20, 1955, at
35, col.2 (Bulgaria's retraction of its security claim regarding downing of Israeli airliner).
39. Chicago Convention, supra note 4, at 1.
40. Id. at Art. 84.
41. Id. at Annex 2, Attachment A.2.1 (1981).
42. Id. at Art. 25.
43. Id. at Art. 4.
tions for the interception of intruding aircraft." These state that
interception should be avoided and undertaken only as a last resort
and its purpose should be limited to identification and assistance.
Further, "intercepting aircraft should refrain from the use of weap-
ons in all cases of interception of civil aircraft." 5 Unfortunately
these are only recommendations, lacking the force of law. States are
only urged to implement them.
France has put forth the most promising current proposal. This
proposal, included with highest priority in the ICAO Council's Work
Programme, would amend the Chicago Convention to provide that
all Contracting States undertake to abstain from the use of force
against civil aircraft."' The French also seek to invoke Article 94(b)
which would force member nations to accept the amendment or
withdraw from ICAO. This is a good starting point.
The nations of the world should join together as they did in the
early 1970s to combat terrorist acts against civilian aircraft. 7 Strict
standards for interception of aircraft should be developed and should
include mandatory training of interceptor pilots in accepted interna-
tional practices and aircraft identification.48 Such standards of
course must recognize the potential security threat posed by intrud-
ing aircraft.
An important part of the development of these strict standards
is a thorough technical study of the problem. The ICAO Council
initiated such a study after the downing of Flight 007, 4 but the So-
viets hampered the search efforts for that plane's wreckage. 0 More-
over, the Soviets neither cooperated with the ICAO investigation nor
allowed Korean, Japanese or United States observers at the Soviet
investigation, as is required by Article 26 of the Convention and rec-
44. Id. at Annex 2, Attachment A.
45. Id.
46. Proposal by France, ICAO Doc. C-WP/7694 (9/14/83) (accepted by consensus ex-
cept for the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia). The French draft of the amendment would add the
following: "All Contracting States undertake to abstain from resorting to the use of force
against civil aircraft subject to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and, in
particular, Article 51 thereof concerning the exercise of the right of individual or collective
self-defense." ICAO Assembly, 24th Sess., Information Paper no.1 (related to ICAO Doc.
A24-WP/49 P/18 (9/21/83)).
47. Cf. FitzGerald, Concerted Action Against States Found in Default of Their Interna-
tional Obligations in Respect of Unlawful Interference with International Civil Aviation, 1972
CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 261.
48. This poses a problem because Article 3 of the Chicago Convention excludes "state
aircraft" from the other provisions of the Convention. Military interceptors clearly are state
aircraft. To establish effective standards of practice, the proposed amendment should include
language overriding Article 3 in cases of military interception of civilian aircraft.
49. Resolution Adopted by the Council on 16 September 1983, ICAO Doc. A24-WP/
49, Appendix (Sept. 20, 1983).
50. Such "interference" arguably is within the letter of the law because the Soviets have
the first right to investigate the accident under the Convention.
ommended by Annex 13.61 It is certainly doubtful that the Soviet
investigation will provide a basis for improving air safety.52
Meanwhile, ICAO and the countries along the western Pacific
air route have begun to tighten the system of navigational aids and
to change route pattern.5 3 These measures will help to prevent repe-
tition of the Flight 007 tragedy. Commercial airliners, however, in-
evitably will stray off course on occasion. This is particularly worri-
some because the Soviets have vowed to use force again if their
sovereignty is violated.54
Thus, action must be taken to dissuade nations from using
deadly force on commercial airliners that inadvertently violate their
airspace. In the first quarter of 1984, the ICAO Assembly will meet
in Extraordinary Session to examine and adopt the amendment to
the Chicago Convention now being drafted by the Council.55 All na-
tions that respect the lives of travelers in international civil aviation
should support a strong amendment.
51. Aviation Officials to Discuss Flight 7 in Soviet, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1983, sec. A,
at 33, col. 1. On March 6, 1984, the ICAO Council condemned the Soviet Union for shooting
down the Korean Airliner and deplored the Soviet failure to cooperate with the ICAO investi-
gation. Aviation Council Faults Soviet, N.Y. Times, March 7, 1984, sec. A, at 4, col. 3.
52. Any report of such investigation would be almost unique. The only accident investi-
gation report from the U.S.S.R. published by ICAO is Balkan-Bulgaria Airlines Accident at
Moskva, U.S.S.R., ICAO Circ. 132-AN/93 at 63. See also Aeroflot Airliner Reported to
Crash in Soviet, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1983, at All, col. 1.
53. See FAA Studies Upgrade Pacific Navaids, 119 AvIATION WEEK SPACE TECH. 18
(Sept. 19, 1983); ICAO Considers Replacing Route System on Pacific, id. at 33.
54. Soviet Cautions West, supra note 25.
55. See Proposal by France, supra note 46.
EPILOGUE
The ICAO Assembly met April 24 through May 11, 1984. Dur-
ing the first days the meeting was deadlocked over procedure for
considering the four proposed draft amendments. On these first days
delegates were not very hopeful of a positive outcome. By the end of
the session, however, the Executive Committee had negotiated a
compromise leading to the unanimous adoption by the Assembly of
Article 3 bis., which provides as follows:
(a) The contracting States recognize that every State
must refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against
civil aircraft in flight and that, in case of interception, the
lives of persons on board and the safety of aircraft must
not be endangered. This provision shall not be interpreted
as modifying in any way the rights and obligations of
States set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.
(b) The contracating States recognize that every State,
in the exercise of its sovereignty, is entitled to require the
landing at some designated airport of a civil aircraft flying
above its territory without authority or if there are reason-
able grounds to conclude that it is being used for any pur-
pose inconsistent with the aims of this Convention; it may
also give such aircraft any other instructions to put an end
to such violations. For this purpose, the contracting States
may resort to any appropriate means consistent with rele-
vant rules of international law, including the relevant pro-
visions of this Convention, specifically paragraph (1) of
this Article. Each contracting State agrees to publish its
regulations in force regarding the interception of civil
aircraft.
(c) Every civil aircraft shall comply with an order given
in conformity with paragraph (b) of this Article. To this
end each contracting State shall establish all necessary
provisions in its national laws or regulations to make such
compliance mandatory for any civil aircraft registered in
that State or operated by an operator who has his
pricnipal place of business or permanent residence in that
State. Each contracting State shall make any violation of
such applicable laws or regulations punishable by severe
penalties and shall submit the case to its competent au-
thorities in accordance with its laws or regulations.
(d) Each contracting State shall take appropriate mea-
sures to prohibit the deliberate use of any civil aircraft
registered in that State or operated by an operator who
has his principal place of business or permanent residence
in that State for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of
this Convention. This provision shall not affect paragraph
(a) or derogate from paragraphs (b) and (c) of this
Article.
This amendment will require ratification by 102 contracting states to
come into force."
56. Report of the Executive Committee to the Plenary on 10 May 1984, ICAO Doc.
A25-WP/20.
